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Abstract
Although recent work in AI has made great
progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form
games, the underlying assumption in most past
work is that the parameters of the game itself are
known to the agents. This paper deals with the rel-
atively under-explored but equally important “in-
verse” setting, where the parameters of the under-
lying game are not known to all agents, but must
be learned through observations. We propose a dif-
ferentiable, end-to-end learning framework for ad-
dressing this task. In particular, we consider a reg-
ularized version of the game, equivalent to a partic-
ular form of quantal response equilibrium, and de-
velop 1) a primal-dual Newton method for finding
such equilibrium points in both normal and exten-
sive form games; and 2) a backpropagation method
that lets us analytically compute gradients of all rel-
evant game parameters through the solution itself.
This ultimately lets us learn the game by training in
an end-to-end fashion, effectively by integrating a
“differentiable game solver” into the loop of larger
deep network architectures. We demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of the learning method in several set-
tings including poker and security game tasks.
1 Introduction
Recent work in artificial intelligence has led to huge advances
in methods for solving large-scale, zero-sum, extensive form
games, both from methodological and applied standpoints.
From the algorithmic approach, methods based on Counter-
factual Regret Minimization [Zinkevich et al., 2008] and first-
order methods for game solving [Kroer et al., 2017], have en-
abled solutions to larger and larger games. In terms of appli-
cations, there have been a number of recent breakthroughs,
including exceeding human performance in no-limit poker
[Brown and Sandholm, 2017; Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017], essen-
tially weakly solving limit poker [Bowling et al., 2015], work
in security games with applications to infrastructure security
[Pita et al., 2009], and many others. However, virtually all
this progress in game theoretic approaches to large games
has operated under the assumption that the parameters of the
game are known to the solvers, and that the main challenge
is simply finding the optimal strategy. In contrast, in many
real world scenarios, certain elements of the game (e.g., pay-
off matrices, chance node probabilities, etc), are unknown to
some of the agents prior to the game. For example, in security
games, we may want to understand the underlying payoffs of
an adversary, rather than just their observed strategy, to better
understand how aspects of the game can be manipulated or
changed to get a desirable outcome.
In this paper, we propose an end-to-end framework for
learning the parameters of uncertain games (both for normal-
form and extensive-form games), purely by observing the ac-
tions of the agents. Although there has been a great deal
of work at the intersection of game theory and reinforce-
ment learning [Busoniu et al., 2008; Bowling and Veloso,
2000], most game-theoretic analysis either assumes that the
payoffs underlying the game are known (this is the standard
game theory setting), or forgoes trying to learn an explicit
and complete representation of the game and instead looks
for merely learning agent strategies that will perform well
[Letchford et al., 2009; Vorobeychik et al., 2007; Fearnley
et al., 2015]. However, in many cases when the true underly-
ing payoffs of the agents are not known, our primary goal is
precisely to recover or understand the payoffs. The few ex-
ceptions that focus on learning the payoffs often rely on spe-
cial structures of the game (e.g., symmetry in multiplayer set-
ting [Vorobeychik et al., 2007]), or querying the best response
of the agent with unknown payoffs by asking other agents
to play carefully designed strategies [Blum et al., 2014;
Letchford et al., 2009]. However, the general problem of
learning game parameters by observing actions is still under-
explored. One of the most closely-related works to our own
is the Computational Rationalization framework [Waugh et
al., 2011], though 1) our approach differs in how the utili-
ties/payoffs are modeled; and 2) we crucially focus heavily
on the extensive form settings, whereas this past work con-
sidered only normal form games.
The crux of our approach is to consider the quantal re-
sponse equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equi-
librium (NE) that includes some possibility of agents acting
suboptimally. We show that the solution of the QRE is a
differentiable function of the game payoff matrix, and back-
propagation can be computed analytically via implicit differ-
entiation. We develop a solver that jointly solves the QRE
for two-player zero-sum games using a primal-dual Newton
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Figure 1: An example architecture utilizing our proposed module.
Method, and allows us to compute the derivatives of agent
actions with respect to the underlying payoff matrix. This en-
ables us to develop end-to-end learning approaches that can
infer the payoff matrix or other parameters underlying a game
merely from samples of the agents acting according to their
QREs. 1 More generally, the method allows for (both normal
form and extensive form) game-solving to be integrated as a
module in deep learning systems, a strategy that can find use
in multiple application areas.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on sev-
eral domains: a toy normal-form game where payoffs depend
on external context; a one-card poker game (with a small rep-
resentation in strategic form, but which would already be too
large to solved in normal form); and a security resource al-
location game, which is an extensive-form generalization of
defender-attacker game in security domain. In all settings, we
show that our approach is able to learn, solely from observed
actions, the relevant underlying parameters of the game, such
as the payoff matrices or (agent belief over) chance node
probabilities. We believe this represents a substantial step
forward in understanding how game theoretic methods can
be applied to uncertain settings, where the “true” parameters
of the game are unknown to an agent. Due to space con-
straints, supplementary material and appendices are available
at arXiv.2
2 Learning and Quantal Response in Normal
Form Games
Our game-solving module provides all the elements required
to perform differentiable learning through the game solution.
The resulting learning approach learns a mapping from con-
textual features x to payoff matrices P and computes equi-
librium strategies (u∗, v∗) under a new set of contextual fea-
tures. An example architecture is presented in Figure 1. Here,
P is parameterized by a domain-dependent low-dimensional
vector φ, which is dependent on a differentiable function
M1(x). Similarly, the loss function is taken after applying
any differentiable M2(u∗, v∗). For the remainder of the pa-
per, we focus on zero-sum games, which capture a wide class
of adversarial environments.
We begin by considering normal form games. Although
normal form games have limited real-world utility due to the
fact that they can only handle relatively small-scale settings,
1Naturally, there are some questions here about when games are
identifiable or not; in general, the answer is no, because e.g. many
payoff matrices can lead to identical strategies or policies for the
agent, so we do not expect to always be able to recover a true under-
lying payoff matrix. However, we show that for various classes of
parametrized games, our approach is able to recover the true under-
lying payoffs of different agents.
2https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.02777
the game solver and learning approach in this restricted set-
ting captures much of the intuition and basic methodology of
our approach.
2.1 Zero-Sum Normal Form Games
In two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix P , a classic
min-max formulation to compute the NE is as follows
min
u
max
v
uTPv (1)
subject to 1Tu = 1, u ≥ 0 (2)
1T v = 1, v ≥ 0, (3)
u and v denote the (mixed) strategies employed by the
min and max player respectively. The solution (u∗, v0)
to this optimization problem and the solution (u0, v∗) of
the corresponding problem with inversed player order (i.e.,
minv maxu u
TPv) forms the Nash equilibrium (u∗, v∗).
Here we present an introduction to our approach consider-
ing the case where the payoff matrix P is not known a priori.
P could represent either a single fixed but unknown payoff
matrix, or, in a more complex setting, depend on some ex-
ternal context x. For example, in anti-poaching games [Fang
et al., 2016], P depends on temperature and precipitation.
In general, however, we consider the case where we observe
samples of actions a(i), i = 1, . . . , N , consisting of observed
actions, from one or both players, sampled from the equilib-
rium strategies (u∗, v∗). The goal is to recover the true un-
derlying payoff matrix P , or a function form P (x) depending
on the current context.
2.2 Quantal Response Equilibria
While extremely powerful both theoretically and as a model-
ing tool, the NE is poorly-suited for our purposes because:
1. NEs are overly strict. In practice, many payoff matrices
result in actions never being played. This tends to be
overly restrictive and does not adequately describe real-
world scenarios where players are boundedly rational.
2. NEs in zero-sum games may not be unique. This leads
to difficulties when resolving which NE to select.
3. NEs are discontinuous with respect to P – a small
change in P can lead to jumps in u∗, v∗. This pre-
cludes integrating the technique into differentiable learn-
ing procedures.
To address these issues, in our learning setting we pro-
pose to model the player’s action with the quantal response
equilibria [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995] instead. In general,
QRE models situations where payoff matrices are injected
with some noise. Specifically, we consider the logit equilib-
rium, where payoffs are perturbed by samples from a Gumbel
distribution. The smoothness of QRE makes gradient-based
approaches feasible [Amin et al., 2016]. It is known that for
zero-sum games, the logit equilibrium obeys the fixed point 3
3In the QRE, there is an additional rationality parameter λ. In
this work, we fix λ = 1 throughout.
u∗i =
exp(−Pv)i∑
q∈[n] exp(−Pv)q
, v∗j =
exp(PTu)j∑
q∈[m] exp(PTu)q
.
(4)
It is further known that for a fixed opponent strategy, the
logit equilibrium corresponds to a strategy regularized by the
Gibbs entropy [Mertikopoulos and Sandholm, 2016]. Since
the Gibbs entropy is strictly convex, the regularized best re-
sponse is unique.
2.3 End-to-End Learning
In order to integrate zero-sum game solvers into an end-to-
end learning framework, we need a method for “differentiat-
ing through” the game solution itself; that is, we need to com-
pute the Jacobian (or more precisely, compute the Jacobian-
vector products needed for backpropagation) of the quantal
equilibrium solution with respect to the payoff matrix. Our
method for doing so relies on techniques from differential cal-
culus, and is a relatively straightforward extension of similar
approaches to differentiating through optimization problems.
However, as a prelude to the more involved extensive form
solution that we will discuss shortly, we describe our method
in some detail, which involves both a particular approach to
solving the QRE and to differentiating through its solution.
QRE Solver
We observe that finding the fixed point in (4) is equivalent to
solving the regularized min-max game
min
u∈Rn
max
v∈Rm
uTPv −H(v) +H(u)
subject to 1Tu = 1, 1T v = 1,
(5)
whereH(y) is the Gibbs entropy
∑
i yi log yi. Notice that the
non-negative constraints are implicit from the entropy term,
and that the entropy regularization renders the equilibrium
continuous with respect to P . Intuitively, entropy regulariza-
tion encourages players to play more randomly, and no action
has probability 0. Furthermore, since the objective is strictly
a convex-concave problem, it has a unique saddle point which
corresponds to (u∗, v∗).
This formulation leads to a solver for the QRE for two-
player zero-sum games, using a primal-dual Newton Method.
To begin, the KKT conditions for the above problem are
Pv + log(u) + 1 + µ1 = 0
PTu− log(v)− 1 + ν1 = 0
1Tu = 1, 1T v = 1,
(6)
where µ, ν are Lagrange multipliers for the equality con-
straints on u, v respectively. Following Newton’s method, we
get the following update rule, which provides a convergent
method for computing the QRE for 2 player zero-sum games
Q
∆u∆v∆µ
∆ν
 = −
 Pv + log u+ 1 + µ1PTu− log v − 1 + ν1
1Tu− 1
1v − 1
 , (7)
where Q is the Hessian of the Lagrangian, given by
Q =

diag( 1u ) P 1 0
PT −diag( 1v ) 0 1
1T 0 0 0
0 1T 0 0
 . (8)
Differentiating Through QRE Solutions
The QRE solver also provides a method for computing the
necessary Jacobian-vector products. The derivation follows
in a similar manner to recent work in differentiating equality-
constrained optimization problems [Gould et al., 2016; John-
son et al., 2016; Amos and Kolter, 2017] (the only difference
being the min-max objective instead of a pure minimization
objective, but since we compute differentials via the KKT
conditions, the differences are minor). Specifically, given
the solution (u∗, v∗) to the QRE, and considering some loss
function L(u∗, v∗) (for example, the log-likelihood of some
observed data given this equilibrium probabilities), we show
here how to compute the gradient of the loss with respect to
the payoff P . In particular, taking differentials of the KKT
conditions and rearranging leads to the following expression
Q [du dv dµ dν]
T
=
[−dPv − dPTu 0 0]T . (9)
For small changes denoted by du, dv, we have
dL = [∇uL ∇vL 0 0] [du dv dµ dν]T
= [∇uL ∇vL 0 0]Q−1
[−dPv − dPTu 0 0]T
=
[
vT dPT uT dP 0 0
]
Q−1 [−∇uL −∇vL 0 0]T ,
where the last step is from symmetry of Q. This expression
governs how small changes in dP affect L. For example, we
may obtain the change in L after perturbing a single entry in
P . Applying this procedure to all entries in P , simplifying
and taking limits as dP is small yields
∇PL = yuvT + uyTv , (10)
where
[yu yv yµ yν ]
T
= Q−1 [−∇uL −∇vL 0 0]T .
Hence, the forward and backward passes with our mod-
ule are respectively given by: 1) Using the expression in (7),
solve for the logit equilibrium given P , and 2) Using ∇uL
and∇vL, obtain∇PL using (10). It is stressed that the mod-
ule is sufficiently general to be included in any existing archi-
tecture where having a zero-sum game module is appropriate.
A Note on Identifiability
As mentioned in Section 1, it is natural to ask if the games are
identifiable – that is, is there a unique P which under the logit
QRE, generates u∗, v∗? The answer is no, in general. Assum-
ing u∗, v∗ are fixed, we can rewrite the KKT conditions in (6)
as a system of linear equations in P . This system hasO(nm)
unknowns but only O(n + m) constraints. This implies that
without a sufficiently compact parametrization, there will be
infinitely many payoff matrices leading to identical equilibria.
For example, one can add a constant to all entries in P with-
out changing the QRE. When under-constrained, one cannot
expect to recover P . However, as we show below, there are
also many settings where it is possible to recover underlying
parameters reliably.
3 Learning Extensive Form Games (EFG)
3.1 Sequence Form Representation
In practice, many games are more naturally and compactly
represented in extensive form. Unfortunately, learning pay-
off matrices of their equivalent normal form representation
is computationally unfeasible even for small games. For ex-
ample, one-card poker has 226 pure strategies per player. In
order to facilitate learning of EFGs, we turn to the sequence
form representation [Von Stengel, 1996], which is sufficiently
rich to represent all strategic behaviors given perfect recall.
The sequence form replaces pure strategies by partial de-
scription of sequences specifying the player’s moves over the
game tree. Instead of probability vectors, we are interested
in realization plans u ∈ Rn, v ∈ Rm, each a vector of size
equal to possible actions throughout the game (thus, n and
m are equal to the size of the game tree’s action nodes for
each player). Realization plans represent probabilities of per-
forming a sequence of actions, in isolation from chance and
other player’s moves. Mathematically, this is represented by
the linear constraints Eu = e, Fv = f . Here, E,F are ma-
trices with entries in {−1, 0, 1}, while e, f are vectors con-
taining {0, 1}. Together, they specify ‘flow’ constraints and
implicitly encode parent-child relationships and information
sets. These constraints may be seen as a generalization of
the requirement that u, v lie in probability simplexes. The
likelihood of arriving at a given node of the game tree is the
product of probabilities of each sequence, multiplied by the
probabilities needed by the chance player.
3.2 Dilated Entropy Regularization
Denote Iu and Iv to be all information sets for the min and
max player. For an information set i ∈ Iu ∪ Iv , Ai denotes
the possible actions at information set i, while pi is the action
(from the same player) preceding i. Similarly, define ρa to be
the information set immediately preceding the action a ,i.e. i
where a ∈ Ai. As with the normal form representation, we
solve the regularized min-max problem
min
u
max
v
uTPv +
∑
i∈Iu
∑
a∈Ai
ua log
ua
upi
−
∑
i∈Iv
∑
a∈Ai
va log
va
vpi
.
(11)
This form of regularization is known as dilated entropy
[Kroer et al., 2017] or normalized entropy [Boyd and Van-
denberghe, 2004], and is known to be strictly convex/concave
in u and v respectively. Observe that this formulation oper-
ates in O(m + n) dimensions. The number of sequences is
bounded by the size of the game tree and is normally much
smaller than the number of pure strategies.
One of our first primary results in this paper is the fact that
this particular form of regularization, applied to the sequence
form, recovers the QRE as applied to the equivalent reduced
normal form game (that is, the normal form representation of
the extensive form, but with unattainable strategies omitted).
Theorem 1. The solution to (11) is realization equivalent to
the QRE of the game in reduced normal form.
Proof. (Sketch) Consider the max player in isolation and his
game tree, represented by alternating actions and information
states. Choose any action a0 with parallel information sets,
near the bottom of the tree (i.e. all child information sets are
leaves). In sequence form, this action and its subtree may be
coalesced into a set of strategies, corresponding to the Carte-
sian product
∏
{i|pi=a0}Ai. This essentially converts a part
of the sequence form into normal form. It can be shown that
the solutions to (11) before and after this replacement are re-
alization equivalent. The proof follows by repeated bottom-
up application of this operation, eventually collapsing the tree
to its reduced normal form, all while maintaining realization
equivalence. The full proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 shows dilated entropy regularization leads to
a well-accepted solution concept, even if it differs slightly
from the more traditional definition of the QRE for extensive
form games [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998]. A side conse-
quence is that under certain regimes, the excessive gap tech-
nique [Kroer et al., 2017; Hoda et al., 2010] used to quickly
solve zero-sum EFGs converges to the NE specified by QRE
in reduced normal form, as the rationality-parameter tends to
∞.
3.3 Differentiable Learning in Sequence Form
Here we derive a differentiable formulation of the sequence
form QRE, mirroring our derivation for the normal form case,
but admittedly with significantly more complex notation due
to the more involved entropy term. The KKT conditions of
our optimization problem are,
(Pv)a + 1 + log(ua)− log(upi)
− Ja +
∑
c∈Ca
µc − µi = 0, ∀i ∈ U , a ∈ Ai
(PTu)a′ − 1− log(va′) + log(vpi′ )
+ Ja′ +
∑
c∈Ca′
νc − νi′ = 0, ∀i′ ∈ V, a′ ∈ Ai′
Eu− e = 0, Fv − f = 0, u ≥ 0, v ≥ 0
where Ca, Ca′ are sets of possible information sets immedi-
ately following a or a′. Ja, Ja′ are their sizes, i.e. |Ca|, |Ca′ |.
We write the terms on the left hand side as a vector
g(u, v, µ, ν). Taking derivatives again yields the updates for
Newton’s method.−Ξ(u) P E
T 0
PT Ξ(v) 0 FT
E 0 0 0
0 F 0 0

∆u∆v∆µ
∆ν
 = −g(u, v, µ, ν)
Ξ(u)ab =

− 1+Jaua , a = b
1
ub
, pρa = b
1
ua
, pρb = a
Ξ(v)a′b′ =

− 1+Ja′va′ , a
′ = b′
1
vb′
, pρa′ = b
′
1
va′
, pρb′ = a
′
The updates are done in exactly the same manner as (10)
∇PL = yuvT + uyTv , (12)
whereyuyvyµ
yν
 =
−Ξ(u) P E
T 0
PT Ξ(v) 0 FT
E 0 0 0
0 F 0 0

−1 −∇uL−∇vL0
0
 .
R P S
R 0 −b1 b2
P b1 0 −b3
S −b2 b3 0
Figure 2: Payoff matrix of modified Rock-Paper-Scissors. Values
shown are for the row player.
Implementation Notes
We can use this differentiable game solver within an auto-
matic differentiation framework to easily obtain gradients of
virtually any loss with respect to any of the game parameters.
In particular, we used the PyTorch automatic differentiation
library [Paszke et al., 2017], and will release the full code for
our solver as open source along with the release of this paper.
4 Experiments
We empirically demonstrate our module’s novel aspects –
learning extensive form games in the presence of side infor-
mation, with partial observations. In the first experiment, we
learn a non-symmetric variant of rock, paper, scissors with
side information. We illustrate the learning of extensive form
games with one-card poker, and learning with partial informa-
tion with a security resource allocation game. In all cases, we
minimize the log-loss of the observed sequence - that is, max-
imizing the likelihood of realizing observed sequence from
the player, assuming he acts in accordance to the QRE.
Due to space constraints, hyper-parameters and details of
train/test environment are deferred to the Appendix. Gener-
ally, our module works well with a medium or large batch
size (e.g. 128), RMSProp [Tieleman and Hinton, 2012] or
Adam [Kingma and Ba, 2014] optimizers with learning rates
between [0.0001, 0.01].
4.1 Rock, Paper, Scissors
Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) is among the most well-studied
2-player zero-sum game. It is well known that playing uni-
formly is an NE and QRE for RPS. In this experiment, we
consider the following variant (Figure 2), which breaks sym-
metry between the 3 actions. Notice that the traditional RPS
is recovered when b1, b2, b3 are all 1.
We assume that each of the b’s is a linear function of some
features x ∈ R2, i.e., by = xTwy, y ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where wy
are to be learned. Features in the dataset and ground-truth
weights are drawn uniformly from [0, 1], and [0, 10] respec-
tively. Experiments were evaluated with a fixed test set of
size 2000. The results presented in Figure 3 illustrate 2 key
points. The first plot shows that dramatically improves with
larger datasets, both in terms of parameters learned and pre-
dicted strategies. The second plot shows that with a reason-
ably sized dataset, convergence is stable and is fairly quick.
However, it was observed that when the dataset is small (e.g.
200), the model may diverge from the ground truth.
4.2 One-Card Poker
We consider a simple poker game where players are dealt a
single card, with ante/bets of 10, and two stages of betting
for the first player. Specifically, suppose n cards labeled 1
Figure 3: Left: MSE of parameters and predicted mixed strategies.
Right: Convergence over 2000 epochs, using a dataset of size 2000.
Figure 4: MSE of card weights (left) and realization plans (right).
through n are dealt uniformly. Both players begin with an
ante of 10. Player 1 decides whether to bet an additional 10,
followed by Player 2 (who folds if he does not call). Lastly,
Player 1 may choose to bet if Player 2 raises. Both players
are obliged to reveal their card at the end of each game.
While relatively simple, the game contains the key ele-
ments in extensive-form games and the strategic concepts in
poker such as slow playing (e.g. not betting even if Player
1 holds the high card) and bluffing (e.g. betting even if the
player holds a low card). Despite its simple structure, the
game with n cards has 22n normal form pure strategies for
each player. This exponential explosion of strategies is not
improved by using the reduced normal form. However, in se-
quence form, we only need to work with realization plans of
size 4n.
Experimental Setup
We assume that the deck is stacked non-uniformly. Our goal
is to learn this distribution of cards after observing many
rounds of play. Let d ∈ Rn, d ≥ 0,∑i di = 1 be the weights
of cards. The probability that the players are dealt cards (i, j)
(i 6= j) is di× dj1−di . Note that this distribution is asymmetric
between players. Matrices P,E, F for the case n = 4 are
presented in the Appendix.
Remark. While counting cards seems to be a straight-
forward way to learn the card distribution when d does not
change over time, our method is suited to learn the player’s
perceived or believed distribution of cards, which may be dif-
ferent from the distribution of cards dealt. This may even
be a function of contextual features such as demographics of
players.
A total of three experiments were run with n = 4. For each
experiment, d ∼ Dir(1, 1, 1, 1). Each experiment comprises 5
runs of training, with same weights but different training sets.
Training was for 2500 epochs, which was observed to be after
convergence. The mean squared error of learned parameters
are averaged over all runs and are presented in Figure 4.
{#D1,#D2} {0, 3} {1, 2} {2, 1} {3, 0}
T1 −R1 − 12R1 − 14R1 − 18R1
T2 − 18R2 − 14R2 − 12R2 −R2
Figure 5: Security resource allocation game. n = 2, k = 3.
Figure 6: MSE of target values. Left: t=1, Right: t=2
4.3 Security Resource Allocation Game
In this set of experiments, we demonstrate the ability to learn
from incomplete observations in a setting that abstracts at-
tacks in cybersecurity domain. The defender possesses k in-
distinguishable and indivisible defensive resources, e.g., cy-
ber analysts, which he splits among n targets, {T1, ..., Tn}.
In an attacking attempt, the attacker (row player) chooses one
target. In the event an attack on Ti succeeds, the attacker ob-
tains a reward of Ri (and the defender −Ri), otherwise, the
payoffs to both parties are 0. Each defensive resource inde-
pendently prevents an intrusion with probability 0.5. For ex-
ample, if there are two defenders guarding T1, the chance of
a successful attack on T1 is 122 . This creates a scenario where
the marginal benefit of each defensive resources decreases,
thus requiring the defender to strike a balance. The matrix of
expected payoffs when n = 2, k = 3 is shown in Figure 5.
In addition to considering the case where the attacker
launches a single attack, we also consider a multi-stage game
where the attacker can launch t attacks, one in each stage
while the defender chooses his allocation of resources in stage
1 and cannot change it in later stages. On the other hand, the
attacker has the option of changing his target between stages.
This describes a setting where analysts are deployed to spe-
cific network assets on a daily basis, while attackers are suf-
ficiently nimble to make multiple attacks in a single day. To
understand why the attacker may change target, consider that
target Ti is attacked in stage 1 and the attack is unsuccess-
ful. It may be inferred that it is more likely that Ti is better
guarded, prompting the attacker to switch targets.
Three experiments are run with n = 2, k = 5 for games
with single attack and double attack, i.e, t = 1 and t = 2.
Crucially, in this set of experiments, we learn Ri only based
on observations of the defender’s actions. This setting yields
a 10× 6 sequence form payoff matrix. For each experiment,
R1 and R2 are drawn uniformly in [0, 2]. Each experiment
is run 10 times for at least 2000 epochs per run. The mean
and standard error over each run is presented in Figure 6. The
results show that our algorithm can still recover the game set-
ting by only observing defender’s actions.
4.4 Discussion
As expected, the quality of learned parameters improves as
the number of data points increases. Notable exceptions oc-
cur in (i) the green plot for the security game when t = 2
and (ii) RPS, when comparing between training sizes of 2000
and 5000. These outliers are no longer observed when com-
paring MSE of u, v. For example, Figure 3 shows that pre-
dicted strategies improve significantly when going from 2000
to 5000 samples, showing that despite not converging to bet-
ter parameters, the network still demonstrates a marked im-
provement in predicting player strategies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a fully differentiable module capable
of learning payoff and other parameters in zero-sum games,
given side information and partial observability. The pro-
posed module’s unique capabilities are demonstrated over a
broad range of problems. Future work entails faster solvers
by exploiting structure in the KKT matrix and extensions to
learning general-sum games.
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A Proofs and derivations
A.1 Equivalence to reduced normal form
In this section we present the proof of one of the main tech-
nical results of this paper, that the dilated entropy regulariza-
tion of a extensive form game is equivalent to the standard
entropy-regularized QRE of the equivalent reduced normal-
form game.
Consider the max player in isolation. His game in sequence
form may be represented by a tree with alternating actions
and information sets. Consider the game shown in Figure 7.
Red nodes are vertices and black nodes are information sets.
White squares represent sibling actions of A, which may in
turn, contain other parts of the game tree. The information
states associated with I1, I2 are parallel information states,
i.e. both of which may be reached from A with non-zero
probability (assuming suitable opponent/chance actions).
We show that the optimal solution using dilated entropy
regularization on the game in Figure 7 is realization equiv-
alent to the optimum of the reduced game in Figure 8. Es-
sentially, this operation converts part of the sequences to the
normal form, by replacing parts of the tree with all possibly
contingencies. Repeated application of this operation even-
tually translates the sequence-form representation to the re-
duced normal form. This is performed on the tree in a bottom-
up manner, all while maintaining realization equivalence.
I
A
I1
11 12
I2
21 22
Figure 7: Original sequence form.
Part 1
Let A be the an action such that all immediate child actions
are leaves (e.g. Figure 7) and I be its parent. We condi-
tion on having taken the action A, that is, assume that the
player reaches A with probability 1 (barring chance or the
other player’s actions). We will first show that after condi-
tioning, the resultant reduced normal form is equivalent to its
sequence form.
Notation. Recall CA = {Ik} denotes the children in-
formation sets of A. The action set at Ik is denoted by
Ak = {Akj} = {a ∈ Av|ρa = Ik}. For the purposes of
I
A(11,21) A(11,22) A(12,21) A(12,22)
Figure 8: After a single iteration.
this derivation, the opponent’s strategy is fixed, and his strat-
egy profile is combined to give PTu = x.
In normal form, all contingencies are accounted for, and
the set of pure strategies are given by the Cartesian product
of action sets AˆA =
∏
kAk. We denote the normal form
mixed strategy profile, payoff matrix, and normal form pay-
off vector as vˆ, Pˆ and xˆ = PˆT uˆ. Note that the sizes of these
vectors/matrices are not equivalent to their counterparts in se-
quence form. For convenience, we define f(vˆ) to be a func-
tion mapping vˆ to v by performing the appropriate marginal-
ization. Let g(v, j) be the distribution of actions extracted
from v supposing an information state of Ij . For simplicity let
H now define the Shannon entropy, H(y) = −∑ yi log(yi).
Derivation. The resultant QRE in the reduced normal form
is,
max
vˆ
vˆT xˆ+H(vˆ)
= max
vˆ
f(vˆ)Tx+H(vˆ)
= max
vˆ
f(vˆ)Tx+H
⊗
j∈CA
g(f(vˆ), j)

= max
vˆ
f(vˆ)Tx+
∑
j∈CA
H(g(f(vˆ), j))
= max
v
vTx+
∑
j∈CA
H(g(v, j)).
The first line is by definition. The second line holds from
the fact that joint entropy is maximized by independent ran-
dom variables (induced by the marginals g(f(vˆ), j)). That
is, if this independence relationship does not hold, then we
could construct a strictly better candidate solution. The third
line follows from the fact that the joint entropy of mutually
independent random variables is equal to the sum of their en-
tropies. The last line is true since every sequence form strat-
egy is induced by at least one normal form strategy (i.e. the
image of f is equal to the domain of v) and vice versa.
Part 2
In Part 1, we showed realization equivalence when the white
square is non-existent, i.e. there are no other children of I .
In this section, we relax that assumption. For this part of the
proof, I may possibly not be the root.
Consider the full sequence form formulation, starting from
our objective function. We split v (the full realization plan
in sequence form) into two portions, v˜ for actions which are
children of A (i.e. all a where pρa = A), and v´, for the rest
of the actions (at other portions of the tree). We split x into
x˜ and x´ similarly. The objective function may be written as
two nested optimization problems,
max
v
vTx−
∑
i∈Iv
∑
a∈Ai
va log
va
vpi
= max
v´
v´T x´−
∑
pi 6=A
∑
a∈Ai
va log
va
vpi
+ v˜T x˜−
∑
pi=A
∑
a∈Ai
va log
va
vpi
Observe that the flow constraints dictate that for any infor-
mation set under A, the corresponding children actions in v˜
sums to vA. Hence, we may write the optimization problem
in terms of normalized (conditional) probabilities, v¯, which
do indeed sum to 1.
max
v´
(
v´T x´−
∑
pi 6=A
∑
a∈Ai
v´a log
v´a
v´pi
+ v´A max
v¯
v¯T x¯− ∑
pi=A
∑
a∈Ai
v¯a log v¯a
)
After normalization, we may plug in the result in Part 1 into
the inner maximization term, replacing it by its normal form
involving vˆ and xˆ.
max
v´
(
v´T x´−
∑
pi 6=A
∑
a∈Ai
v´a log
v´a
v´pi
+ v´A max
vˆ
(
vˆT xˆ+H(vˆ)
))
= max
v´
(
v´T x´−
∑
pi 6=A
i 6=ρA
∑
a∈Ai
v´a log
v´a
v´pi
−
∑
a∈AρA
a 6=A
v´a log
v´a
v´pρA
− v´A log v´A
v´pρA
+ v´A max
vˆ
(
vˆT xˆ+H(vˆ)
))
= max
v´
(
v´T x´−
∑
pi 6=A
i 6=ρA
∑
a∈Ai
v´a log
v´a
v´pi
−
∑
a∈AρA
a 6=A
v´a log
v´a
v´pρA
− v´A log v´A
v´pρA
+ max∑
vˆ=v´A
(
vˆT xˆ−
∑
vˆ
vˆ log
vˆ
v´A
))
The first line follows from the result in Part 1. The sec-
ond line splits the entropy regularization terms from I into
the terms involving A and those which do not. The last line
follows from ‘reintroducing’ the flow constraints into the in-
ner maximization. Observe that the v´A log v´A terms cancel
out, allowing for the following simplifications,
max
v´
(
v´T x´−
∑
pi 6=A
i 6=ρA
∑
a∈Ai
v´a log
v´a
v´pi
−
∑
a∈AρA
a 6=A
v´a log
v´a
v´pρA
− v´A log 1
v´pρA
+ max∑
vˆ=v´A
(
vˆT xˆ−
∑
vˆ
vˆ log vˆ
))
= max
v´
(
v´T x´−
∑
pi 6=A
i 6=ρA
∑
a∈Ai
v´a log
v´a
v´pi
−
∑
a∈AρA
a 6=A
v´a log
v´a
v´pρA
max∑
vˆ=v´A
(
−
∑
vˆ
vˆ log
1
v´pρA
+ vˆT xˆ−
∑
vˆ
vˆ log vˆ
))
= max
v´
(
v´T x´−
∑
pi 6=A
i 6=ρA
∑
a∈Ai
v´a log
v´a
v´pi
−
∑
a∈AρA
a 6=A
v´a log
v´a
v´pρA
max∑
vˆ=v´A
(
−
∑
vˆ
vˆ log
vˆ
v´pρA
+ vˆT xˆ
))
.
Observe that x´A is zero, since it must be a non-leaf node
(all rewards are deferred to leaves). This allows us to recom-
bine v´ and vˆ into a long vector in sequence form, which we
denote v` – which is the sequence form of the condensed ver-
sion (e.g. Figure 8. The flow constraints in the inner maxi-
mization is ‘compatible’ with the form required by the outer
maximization.
max
v`
v`T x`−
∑
i∈I`v
∑
a∈A`i
v`a log
v`a
v`pi
where the A` and I`v are the action sets in the condensed game
(i.e all the information sets originally children of A are gone,
and the actions in the normal form are now actions in ρA). x`
refers to the reward vector obtained by merging xˆ, x´ together,
and removing the term associated with x´A (which was 0 to
begin with).
The final part of the proof follows by repeatedly applying
the transform described. Note that it is always possible to
find a suitable I and A for this process, if not, then we have
already arrived at the reduced normal form. The number of
non-leaf actions must drop monotonically, hence the process
will terminate at some point. Lastly, observe that our assump-
tion that non-leaf actions have 0 payoffs is remains true after
every iteration.
B Experimental setup
B.1 E, F, P matrices for one-card poker
Here we provide a complete example of how to encode and
parameterize one-card poker in sequence form, as required
by our approach. We begin with the linear constraints in se-
quence form. Recall E and F matrices define the structure of
the game state transitions, Eu − e = 0, Fv − f = 0. For a
game with 4 cards, there are 8 information sets and 16 actions
per player. The constraint matrices are given by
E =
[
I I 0 0
−I 0 I I
]
F =
[
I 0 I 0
0 I 0 I
]
e = [1111111100000000]T
f = [1111111111111111]T
where each I has a size of 4.
We now turn to parameterization of the payoff matrix
in terms of the card distribution d. Suppose for the
time being that the deck is uniformly stacked, i.e. d =
(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25). Define the showdown matrix
S =
1
12
 0 1 1 1−1 0 1 1−1 −1 0 1
−1 −1 −1 −1

and the forfeit matrix.
X =
1
12
0 1 1 11 0 1 11 1 0 1
1 1 1 0

. Then
P =
S 0 0 00 0 −X 2S0 X 0 0
0 2S 0 0

where by our convention, the row player is the minimizing
player. Each block is of size 4 × 4, and gives possible out-
comes for each of the 42 possible ways of dealing cards. The
4 blocks for the row player correspond to the actions ‘do not
raise on first move’, ‘raise on first move’, ‘fold on second
move’, ‘raise on second move’. For the column player, the
16 actions are ‘fold after first player did not raise’, ‘raise after
first player did not raise’, ‘fold after first player raised’, ‘raise
after first player raised’.
When d is not uniform, define the 4× 4 distribution matrix
Dij =
didj
1− di .
The payoff matrix is thenD ◦ S 0 0 00 0 −1 ◦D 2D ◦ S0 1 ◦D 0 0
0 2D ◦ S 0 0

i.e. every 4× 4 block is pointwise weighted by the chance of
being dealt the relevant cards. It may be seen that the forfeit
matrix X is really just the all-ones matrix multiplied point-
wise by D.
B.2 Experimental setup
All of the experiments are run using CPU cycles.
Rock, paper, scissors
Experiments were run on a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i5 with 16
GB of RAM. The learning rate is 0.0005, with a batch size of
128. We utilized the Adam optimizer. The maximum num-
ber of epochs before termination is 10000. Parameters were
initialized to the 0-matrix for each experiment.
One card poker
Experiments are run on a 4.2GHz Intel Core i7 with 128GB
of RAM . The learning rate is 0.002, batch size of 128, using
the RMSProp optimizer. Weights are initialized to be uni-
form, i.e. (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25). In order to ensure that d is
valid probability distribution, the features are passed through
softmax layer which then outputs d. The maximum number
of epochs is 2500, although convergence occurs significantly
faster. Since there is no context, experiments may be run
much faster by computing the forward pass just once for each
minibatch. Similarly, the inverse matrix required in the back-
ward pass may be cached and reused between each member
in the same minibatch.
Security resource allocation game
The experiments were run on an Amazon c4.2xlarge EC2 in-
stance. The learning rate is 0.002 using the RMSProp op-
timizer (all other hyperparameters are left as the defaults in
Pytorch). Each run was 2000 epochs. The weights are passed
through f(x) = (tanh(x) + 1) to clip rewards to between
[0, 2] for the payoff matrix.
